Le problème métaphysique central en philosophie de l’esprit concerne la relation entre l’esprit et le corps des agents. Quand on tente d’expliquer, par exemple, le rapport entre les pensées et les actions humaines, on est alors immédiatement confronté avec la difficulté, apparemment insurmontable, d’expliquer la causalité mentale. On doit répondre à la question : nos états de pensée causent-ils effectivement ce que l’on fait? Bien sûr, nos croyances, nos intentions et nos désirs sont à la base de notre comportement, dira (...) le sens commun et une longue tradition philosophique. Cependant, certains philosophes ont récemment manifesté des doutes à propos du rôle réel de nos pensées sur nos actions. Pour contrer ce scepticisme, il nous faut expliquer comment des états de pensée peuvent exercer leur rôle causal dans un monde fondamentalement physique. Je vais donner ici les raisons pour lesquelles je crois que les états de pensée sont indispensables à l’explication complète de nos actions. Pour ce faire, je procéderai à une analyse approfondie de la relation entre la causalité mentale ou intentionnelle et la causalité physique. Je mettrai en perspective deux approches importantes sur la causalité mentale : celle de John Searle, qui défend la réalité des états mentaux et semble résister au réductionnisme, et celle de Jaegwon Kim, qui montre le péril auquel l’approche de Searle est exposée : la surdétermination causale! Selon Searle, le mental est un trait du monde physique . Aux yeux de Kim cette stratification en niveaux n’apporte aucune solution au problème de la causalité mentale. Kim a-t-il raison? (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta algumas considerações do pensador italiano Gianni Vattimo acerca da religião na idade contemporânea. O referido filósofo tem como base de suas reflexões a ideia de uma filosofia pós-moderna que se caracteriza pela desconstrução da metafísica da tradição moderna. Nesse sentido, o autor visualiza nas filosofias de Nietzsche e Heidegger a inauguração de uma nova orientação do pensamento ocidental, marcada por esse rompimento com as filosofias totalizantes e pela consideração do ser como resultado das circunstancias eventuais que compõem (...) a experiência existencial. A religião, por sua vez, não acompanhou tal movimento, mas conservou um pensamento marcado ainda pela estrutura da metafísica tradicional, por isso, não se encontra em condições de responder às atuais demandas deste mundo plural. O autor sinaliza para a necessidade da abdicação das estruturas dogmáticas e dos fundamentalismos da religião como meio para a abertura ao diálogo inter-religioso e intercultural. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Dans la tradition logique de la philosophie analytique, comprendre la signification d’un énoncé, c’est comprendre ses conditions de vérité. Dans la tradition du langage naturel, la signification est liée à l’usage du langage. Depuis Grice, elle est liée aux attitudes et aux actions des interlocuteurs. Selon Austin, Searle et Vanderveken, signifier c’est utiliser des mots avec l’ intention d’accomplir des actes illocutoires. Pareils actes ont des conditions de félicité plutôt que des conditions de vérité. Selon nous, signifier c’est (...) essentiellement tenter d’accomplir des actes illocutoires. Et comme toute tentative est une action intentionnelle plutôt qu’une attitude, signifier c’est agir intentionnellement. ABSTRACT: In the logical tradition of analytical philosophy, to understand the meaning of an utterance is to understand its truth conditions. In the tradition of natural language analysis, meaning is related to language use. Since Grice, meaning is linked to speakers’ attitudes and actions. Following Austin, Searle, and Vanderveken, to mean is to use words with the intention of performing illocutionary acts. Such acts have felicity conditions instead of truth conditions. The aim of my work is to clarify the nature of meaning in the second tradition. In my view, to mean something is mainly to attempt to perform illocutionary acts. Any attempt is an intentional action rather than an attitude. (shrink)

La plupart des approches développées en philosophie adop-tent la notion de représentation pour expliquer la relation entre l’esprit, le langage et le monde. L’idée générale est que les pensées représentent les faits du monde via des concepts et que le langage sert d’intermédiaire entre les deux en exprimant les pensées. Le lien est tissé par la signifi-cation. Certains pensent que la signification peut être analysée en termes des pensées des locuteurs. Comme pareilles pensées sont essentiellement intentionnelles, on explique la signification (...) à partir de l’intentionnalité et donc le langage à partir de l’esprit. Pour d’autres, l’esprit et le langage sont interdépendants. La structure de la pensée est déterminée en ana-lysant la structure profonde du langage. Les agents lient les contenus propositionnels au monde lorsqu’ils pensent ou parlent. Par contre, certains philosophes sont opposés aux deux conceptions antérieures. Ils refusent l’idée d’expliquer la signification en termes de pensées inten-tionnelles. Ils l’expliquent en termes de comportement langagier, mais sans pour autant faire référence au mental. Le langage est alors possible sans la pensée. Le but général de ce travail est de montrer pourquoi les approches philosophiques traditionnelles ont misé sur l’idée de représen-tation ou de signification pour expliquer l’interaction entre l’esprit, le langage et le monde. Plus particulièrement, j’explique pourquoi la théorie des actes de discours adopte une approche intermédiaire. Selon elle, l’esprit fonde le langage. Il y a donc primauté de la pensée sur le langage. Mais le principe d’exprimabilité exige une interdépendance entre pensée et langage. (shrink)

Le présent ouvrage collectif contient les Actes d'un colloque international bilingue sur l'action, les attitudes et la décision que nous avons organisé en hommage à notre regretté collègue J.-Nicolas Kaufmann à Trois-Rivières du 3 au 5 octobre 2002. L'ouvrage présente et discute d'hypothèses, d'enjeux et de théories contemporaines sur l'action, les attitudes, la rationalité et la décision. La première partie intitulée Pensées, actions et engagements contient des contributions de John Searle, Daniel Vanderveken, Candida Jaci de Sousa (...) class='Hi'>Melo et Raimo Tuomela traitant de problèmes généraux de la philosophie de l'esprit et de l'action. Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage intitulée Phénoménologie, ontologie et philosophie de l'esprit, nous avons regroupé, autour d'un texte de Nicolas Kaufmann, quatre études qui traitent diversement de la contribution de la phénoménologie classique, principalement de la phénoménologie de Husserl, à des questions centrales de la philosophie contemporaine dans les domaines de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la théorie de l'action et de l'ontologie formelle. La troisième partie de l'ouvrage, Causalité et naturalisme, réunit trois contributions qui portent sur des questions centrales de la philosophie contemporaine. Daniel Laurier se penche sur la question de savoir si le normativisme sémantique est compatible avec le naturalisme sémantique, alors qu'André Leclerc et Wilson Mendonça s'intéressent à la notion de causalité mentale et examinent différents arguments qui contestent le bien-fondé de cette notion. La dernière partie de l'ouvrage intitulée Rationalité et décision réunit trois contributions logico philosophiques de Storrs McCall, Mathieu Marion et Michel Paquette qui traitent de la rationalité des agents lors de leurs prises de décision et délibérations. (shrink)

Este trabalho visa apresentar a trajetória de uma pesquisa qualitativa em Psicologia, que defini a Fenomenologia e a Historiografia como metodologias. Após delimitar os objetivos da pesquisa em questão, fez-se necessário elaborar um percurso metodológico para alcançá-los. Dessa forma, inicia-se o relato de uma longa jornada que envolve desde a delimitação do universo da pesquisa até os passos da pesquisadora em campo. Este artigo tem como propósito partilhar informações, discutir e minimizar as dificuldades enfrentadas por pesquisadores em trabalho de campo (...) no uso de metodologias de base qualitativa, especificamente a historiografia e a Fenomenologia no método proposto por Amadeo Giorgi e Daniel Sousa. Assim, organiza-se o presente trabalho da seguinte forma: introdução, que recupera a história da pesquisa realizada; percurso metodológico: primeiras pistas; escolha dos participantes, fundamentos metodológicos, passo a passo da pesquisa em campo e considerações finais. (shrink)

This study aims to examine the ethical decision-making model proposed by Schwartz, where we consider the factors of non-rationality and aspects that affect ethical judgments of auditors to make the decision to blow the whistle. In this paper, we argue that the intention of whistleblowing depends on ethical awareness and ethical judgment as well as there is a mediation–moderation due to emotion and perceived moral intensity of auditors. Data were collected using an online survey with 162 external auditors who worked (...) on audit firms in Indonesia as well as 173 internal auditors working in the manufacturing and financial services. The result of multigroup analysis shows that emotion can mediate the relationship between EAW and EJW. The nature of this relationship is more complex and then tested by adding moderating variables using consistent partial least squares approach. We found that EMT and PMI can improve the relationship between ethical judgments and whistleblowing intentions. These findings indicate that internal auditors are more likely to blow the whistle than external auditors; and reporting wrongdoing internally and anonymously are the preferred way of professional accountants to blow the whistle in Indonesia. (shrink)

In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

This work empirically tests the concept of the ‘whistleblowing triangle,’ which is modeled on the three factors encapsulated by the fraud triangle (pressure or financial incentives, opportunity and rationalization), in the Indonesian context. Anchored in the proposition of an original research framework on the whistleblowing triangle and derived hypotheses, this work aims to expand the body of knowledge on this topic by providing empirical evidence. The sample used is taken from audit firms affiliated with both the big 4 and non-big (...) 4 companies operating in Indonesia. The results of analysis using the PLS-PM method found a significant relationship between the components of the whistleblowing triangle and the intention of blowing the whistle. We found that financial incentives are the most significant predictor of auditors’ intention to blow the whistle in Indonesia. Other components, such as opportunity and rationalization, also play an important role in supporting auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Our findings also suggest that related pressures are the top priority for audit firms in Indonesia to consider in increasing whistleblowing intention. We expand the previous literature on whistleblowing which has been derived from the components of the fraud triangle (Brown et al. in Account Public Interest 16(1):28–56, 2016; Smaili and Arroyo in J Bus Ethics, 10.1007/s10551-017-3663-7, 2017) by adding empirical evidence. (shrink)

The book's main argument is that global social injustice is by and large epistemological injustice. It maintains that there can be no global social justice without global cognitive justice.

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Este artigo visa analisar a narrativa (auto)biográfica de estudantes de Pedagogia em uma universidade pública da região do Vale do São Francisco, localizada no território de Petrolina-PE em contexto de pandemia da COVID-19. Para refletir sobre a formação a partir da escrita de si, pautamo-nos, teórica e metodologicamente, em Heidegger, Josso, Freire, Ribeiro, Passeggi, Sousa e Lima. Neste artigo, comtempla-se respostas referentes à como os estudantes se sentiram no processo de formação docente em meio a pandemia e o que (...) esperavam do futuro. A turma do curso de Pedagogia era composta por 19 estudantes, deste total, 17 participaram da atividade da escrita da carta a si. Como estratégia de análise, utilizou-se o método do círculo hermenêutico “heideggeriano”. Assim, as informações foram organizadas em três temas de sentido, sendo: saúde mental na pandemia; ensino remoto versus ensino presencial; e planejamento de carreira. Percebeu-se, por meio das cartas, a preocupação quanto ao ensino remoto, assim como os planos de futuro, com intenção contribuir socialmente para uma educação humana e facilitadora de aprendizagens. Notou-se, ainda, que os estudantes refletiram sobre o bem-estar na profissão, buscando o sentido de suas ações, além de demarcarem o suporte financeiro, emocional, familiar e formativo. (shrink)

Resumo O artigo analisa a pertinência da mediação do ecofeminismo simbólico/cultural para a teologia feminista, especialmente no contexto da América Latina. Argumenta-se que o ecofeminismo teológico não pode ser compreendido de modo homogêneo. Pelo menos dois desdobramentos podem ser identificados na sua constituição: essencialista e construcionista. A conclusão é que ambos proporcionam contribuições significativas para a teologia feminista, porém correm o risco de se afastar do cristianismo e pulverizar as lutas emancipatórias das mulheres. Palavras-chave : Teologia ecofeminista; Igreja; Gênero; Mulheres; (...) Cristianismo.The article analyzes the relevance of the mediation from symbolic/cultural ecofeminism to feminist theology. It is argued that theological ecofeminism cannot be understood in a homogeneous way. At least two deployments are identified in its constitution: essentialist and constructionist. The conclusion is that they bring significant contributions to the feminist theology, but they are likely to turn away from Christianity and spray the historical struggles of women. Key-words: Ecofeminist theology; Church; Gender; Women; Christianity. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multi-dimensional and relative to human realities. The "axiological" position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

Discute-se aqui as aproximações e distanciamentos sobre o cuidado via as contribuições do pensamento de Heidegger e de Foucault. Interessa-nos saber sobre as ideias de autocuidado articuladas por Martin Heidegger e de cuidado de sí, conforme Michel Foucault, analisando as convergências e as divergências. Lançou-se mão da sistematização contrastiva de modo a ressaltar os encontros e desencontros entre os pensadores. Há aproximações no que se refere a importância dada a questão do cuidar como algo constituidor do ser humano, mas os (...) distanciamentos se dão pelo modo como os sentidos de cuidado são concebidos. As aproximações e distanciamentos quanto a autocuidado e cuidado de si pensados por Heidegger e Michel Foucault nos lança a refletir que cada pensador fora atravessado por singularidades, processos históricos, sociais e culturais, desdobrando em compreensões específicas em torno do cuidado. (shrink)

Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the (...) difference? We need to distinguish the criteria of correspondence or appropriateness suitable for authenticity from those that embody the criterion of truth. Furthermore there is also a question about the transitions – among states of mind, and between states of mind and behaviour – that emotions encourage. This realm of transitions concerns rationality. After sketching the relevant distinctions, I will endeavour to justify the view that emotions should be appraised in terms of all three terms. (shrink)

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende resgatar o debate entre Richard Rorty e Nancy Fraser, ocorrido no início da década de 1990, especificamente a partir do texto Feminismo e Pragmatismo apresentado na Tanner Lectures on Human Value. Nesta conferência o filósofo discorreu sobre a possibilidade de conciliação entre o seu pragmatismo e o feminismo. Rorty aborda o feminismo enquanto autocriação da mulher através da “redescrição” mediante a manifestação poética, onde o filósofo encara as feministas como criadoras do novo. Em seguida, exporemos a (...) crítica de Fraser, que trabalha sobre a proposta apresentada pelo pragmatista e que oferece suas próprias ideias dentro de uma concepção do feminismo como movimento democrático de massa. Ao final, uma breve avaliação das implicações das críticas e sugestões apresentadas por Rorty ao feminismo e também da resposta de Fraser. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed 'natural' relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most 'natural' in that sense is (...) always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the Problem of Natural Kinds' sits otiose. (shrink)

The main objective of our research is to analyze the correlation between the struggle for recognition, the National Truth Commission – CNV and collective memory. To achieve our goal, we propose to analyze memory from collective and social struggles evoking collective memory within an intersubjective relationship that involves disputes, negotiations, manipulations and forgetting. It is important to emphasize that the theoretical framework of our work is supported by the debate around the struggles for recognition. Therefore, we will verify, from Axel (...) Honneth, the moral grammar of the struggles around this reciprocal recognition and how this dynamic happens in current social practices and, ipso facto, we intend to articulate the discussion of the communication paradigm with collective memory. (shrink)

Exploring the struggles against moral and cultural imperialism.

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

A kind of “ruthless reductionism” characterized the experimental practices of the first two decades of molecular and cellular cognition. More recently, new research tools have expanded experimental practices in this field, enabling researchers to image and manipulate individual molecular mechanisms in behaving organisms with an unprecedented temporal, sub-cellular, cellular, and even circuit-wide specificity. These tools dramatically expand the range and reach of experiments in MCC, and in doing so they may help us transcend the worn-out and counterproductive debates about “reductionism” (...) and “emergence” that divide neuroscientists and philosophers alike. We describe examples of these new tools and illustrate their practical power by presenting an exemplary recent case of MCC research using them. From these tools and results, we provide an initial sketch of a new image of the behaving organism in its full causal-interactive complexity, with its molecules, cells, and circuits combined within the single system that it is. This new image stands in opposition to the traditional “levels” image of the behaving organism, and even the initial sketch we provide of it here offers hope for avoiding the dreary metaphysical debates about “emergence” and “downward causation,” and even the reduction vs. anti-reduction dispute, all dependent upon the familiar “levels” image. (shrink)

This paper is meant as a contribution to the general issue of authenticity in musical performances, an issue often debated at a rarefied, speculative level, by introducing a comparison between three case studies consisting of the performative choices in three renown recordings of performances of Bach’s Fugue BWV 1000: two on the classical guitar and one on the lute. This approach allows us to pursue in greater detail the tacit aesthetic and ontological underpinnings of such options. Finally, I use the (...) conceptual apparatus gathered to argue that, generally 1) there are no good reasons to believe that a “historicist” approach, per se, will add aesthetic value to a performance and, in particular 2) it is perfectly adequate to use the modern classical guitar in performing Bach’s works. (shrink)

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed ‘natural’ relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most ‘natural’ in that sense is (...) always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the ‘Problem of Natural Kinds’ sits otiose. (shrink)

Os registros históricos humanos sofreram transformações à medida em que evoluíam as tecnologias. Quanto maior a evolução tecnológica, mais informações puderam ser disseminadas. O objetivo desta pesquisa é discutir as possíveis similaridades entre a Ciência da Informação e as nuances pós-modernas. Como procedimentos metodológicos apresenta uma pesquisa de natureza qualitativa e exploratória baseada em uma revisão bibliográfica. O estudo possibilitou a confirmação dos elementos relacionais para uma compreensão dialógica entre a pós-modernidade, a complexidade e a Ciência da Informação. O pensamento (...) pós-moderno questiona paradigmas consolidados na Ciência Moderna, contrapondo-se às ideias e práticas inerentes ao pensamento científico baseado no paradigma dominante, mais especificamente nos preceitos provenientes do racionalismo científico, da visão reducionista e da discrepante realidade de grupos sociais. (shrink)